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Abstract. ‘‘Virtual water,’’ water needed for crop production, is now being mainstreamed in the water policy world.
Relying on virtual water in the form of food imports is increasingly recommended as good policy for water-scarce
areas. Virtual water globalizes discussions on water scarcity, ecological sustainability, food security and consumption.
Presently the concept is creating much noise in the water and food policy world, which contributes to its politicization.
We will argue that the virtual water debate is also a ‘‘real water’’ and food and agricultural policy debate and hence has
political effects. Decisions about food strategies and resource allocation play out on the national political economy,
beneﬁting some while harming others. Therefore, a policy choice for virtual water is not politically neutral.
‘‘Real water’’ interventions are, likewise, inspired by economic as well as political considerations like control of the
countryside, geopolitical strategy, and food sovereignty (independence from international political conditionality and
market uncertainties). To illustrate these ideas, we look into case studies of Egypt and the State of Punjab in India. In
India, a debate on the merits and demerits of a virtual water strategy is now emerging. In Egypt, which switched to
food imports in the early 1970s, a long-standing taboo on debating virtual water is now being relaxed.
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Introduction
‘‘Virtual water’’ is rapidly becoming a key concept in
scientiﬁc and policy debates about regional, national and
global water scarcity (Kumar and Singh, 2005).1 Virtual
water, ‘‘the water required to produce water-intensive
commodities such as grain’’ (Allan, 2002), links the
challenge of water scarcity to global, regional and local
trade ﬂows. The concept has started on a remarkable
march through academic institutions, development
agencies, agricultural research and planning institutions,
and development policy institutions (Rosegrant et al.,
2002; World Water Council, 2004; UNESCO, 2006). The
basic idea is economic: the lions share of exploited
global water resources – up to 90% – goes to food
production, leaving 10% for drinking and other uses
(Allan, 1998). Resulting water scarcity problems can be
solved and economic efﬁciency of water use increased by
adapting global and regional food trade to spatial varia-
tions in water scarcity. In this view a net water-saving
effect can be reached by concentrating production of
water-intensive food crops and products with low water
productivity in water-abundant countries while turning
water-scarce countries into food importers and producers
of less water-intensive crops. While agricultural pro-
duction in the former tends to be based on rain-fed
agriculture, in the latter it requires complex interventions
in the ‘‘real’’ water cycle (irrigation systems, dams,
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groundwater extraction) that often contribute to depletion
of scarce water resources and ecological degradation
(Chapagain et al., 2005; UNESCO, 2006; Wichelns,
2001).2
According to some virtual water analysts, countries or
regions with a water deﬁcit can increase national food
security by importing water-intensive food. The virtual
water discussion focuses primarily on water-deﬁcient
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA
region), where several countries have experienced tem-
porary deﬁcits since the 1950s and demand started
exceeding supply in the early 1970s. Egypt usually
serves as an example of a country that, consciously if
quietly, avoids hydro-political crisis by its strategy of
virtual water import, according to Allan, who coined the
concept (Allan, 1997; 1998; 2002). Stressing that ‘‘more
water ﬂows into the MENA region annually as virtual
water than ﬂows down the Nile into Egypt,’’ Allan has
called virtual water ‘‘the dream solution in water-stressed
economies’’ (Allan, 2002: 29). First, virtual water is
cheap thanks to subsidized foodgrains and trade below
production costs. Second, virtual water is politically
‘‘silent’’ and ‘‘therefore not politically controversial’’
(Allan, 1998: 545). With this solution at hand, why
should countries look for hydraulic solutions or risk
‘‘water wars’’?
Bringing together issues related to food production,
consumption and trade,3 the virtual water metaphor has
stimulated scientiﬁc efforts to estimate and map virtual
water ﬂows between (and within) nations and regions in
the world. This has yielded the water accounts and
‘‘footprints’’ (Hoekstra, 2003) that are prominently
present in the virtual water literature. But the debate is
more than just an abstract academic exercise. It has en-
tered the policy domain, where ‘‘solutions’’ for water
scarcity are produced and environmental conservation
and food strategies based on it are increasingly recom-
mended as good policy for water-scarce areas (Warner
and Johnson, 2007; Wichelns, 2004). Hoekstra and
Hung, for instance, stress that the next step is ‘‘to go
beyond explanation and to study how governments can
deliberately interfere in the current national virtual water
trade balances in order to achieve higher global water use
efﬁciency’’ (Hoekstra and Hung, 2003: 46). In a nutshell,
the concepts main practical ambitions are, ﬁrst, to solve
water scarcity problems at various scales and levels of
governance by making optimal use of comparative
advantage and differences in resource availability; sec-
ond, to prevent water conﬂicts in a ‘‘politically silent’’
manner (Hoekstra, 2003; see Allan, 1998).
In view of the concern over climate change, virtual
water is set to rise on the international political agenda as
a smart solution to future challenges. In its transformation
from analytical concept to policy prescription, we will
argue, the concept becomes more explicitly normative in
its content and real-life consequences, and therewith more
problematic. As the concept becomes ‘‘policy’’ and data
are mobilized for legitimizing certain courses of action in
food production and resources governance, we enter the
ﬁeld of politics. Implementing virtual water policy entails
conscious social and political choices based on speciﬁc
problem perceptions and deﬁnitions, and conceptualiza-
tions of solutions. We must, therefore, liberate the virtual
water debate from its focus on water accounting and
macroeconomics and explore possible contributions to
the debate by political science and other disciplinary
ﬁelds. Is virtual water as inherently ‘‘politically silent’’ as
Allan suggests? Is its intentional ‘‘political silence’’ a
beneﬁt, or are there real political effects?
The approach taken in the present article is to relate the
virtual water debate to the politics of ‘‘real water’’ and
food security. It confronts the conceptualization of virtual
water as ‘‘politically silent’’ with two real-life cases of
water policy at two levels of governance – one a country:
Egypt; the other Punjab, a federal state of India – that
illustrate the political character of virtual water strategies.
As the cases show, a virtual water strategy crucially af-
fects decision-making on ‘‘real’’ water as well as the
political and economic power balance between urban and
rural populations (the Egypt case) or between the central
and regional levels of a state (the Punjab case). This has
important consequences for the livelihoods of rural and
urban people. As an area of political contestation, virtual
water and its consequences in agricultural policy and
natural resources governance unavoidably concern issues
of power and legitimacy. When confronted with the
‘‘real world, this ‘‘politically silent’’ solution may well
be shouted down by the deafening noise of political
processes.
The article is structured as follows. First, we present a
short discussion of the concept. Second, we question the
assumed politically ‘‘silent’’ character of virtual water by
discussing the politics of virtual and real water. Third, we
focus on the water debate in Egypt, long characterized by
a taboo on discussing the policy option of virtual water.
Fourth, we examine the emerging virtual water debate in
the State of Punjab in India, and its relationship to inter-
state water and territorial issues. Finally, we draw a brief
conclusion on beneﬁts and pitfalls of the virtual water
concept.
Virtual water: Rediscovering the political economy
The production of any product requires smaller or larger
volumes of water – its ‘‘water footprint’’ (Hoekstra,
2003), or virtual water. But water use for agriculture is
under growing pressure of reallocation to non-agricultural
sectors and uses.4 Reallocation and the associated com-
peting claims are socially and politically sensitive. Main
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competitors in this arena of water transfers are irrigators
on the one hand, and urban, domestic and industrial users
on the other. The ﬁrst tend to lose out, as water use for
irrigation is regarded as the least beneﬁcial and productive
in market terms (Boelens et al., 2005).
The relation between water and food production can
be visualized through the concept of virtual water. A
nation can deal with water scarcity through the import of
staple foods like wheat and rice so that ‘‘countries are, in
effect, using grain to balance their water books’’ (Brown,
2006: 55). Food imports to a water-scarce country can
release scarce water for more productive (e.g. industrial)
uses (de Fraiture et al., 2004). We will not go into ﬁgures
here, but to give a basic indication: the amount of virtual
water in international trade is estimated at 1.625 Gm3
(1.6 trillion m3) annually, 80% of which is related to
agricultural production, the rest industrial (Chapagain
et al., 2005; UNESCO, 2006).5 This amounts to 16% of
all water use (Hoekstra and Hung, 2003).
Virtual water is useful as it globalizes perspectives on
water scarcity, ecological sustainability, food production
and consumption (Craswell, 2005) and stimulates
reﬂection on processes of socio-economic change in
relation to changing food demands, production needs,
pressures on current production systems and the envi-
ronment (Hoekstra, 2003).6 The concept may also in-
crease public awareness of water scarcity among
consumers, public ofﬁcials and producers (Wichelns,
2004; 2005).
Allans (2001) exhortation to include the workings of
the ‘‘global political economy’’ in national water balance
calculations is a timely antidote to fears of impending
water crises. But it is useful to note that Allans approach
leans heavily on a classical (Ricardian) political-econ-
omy perspective in terms of comparative advantage
(Allan, 2003) and the Heckscher–Olin theory of trade,
which assumes that trade in commodities in fact means a
trade in factors of production (Hakimian, 2003). This
reliance has attracted the criticism that comparative
advantage is more than just water endowments; even
production of water-intensive goods may give a com-
parative advantage to a water-scarce country or region
(Wichelns, 2005). Kumar and Singh (2005) show that
there is no correlation between relative water availability
in a country and its virtual water trade.7 In addition,
water need not be (and tends not to be) the decisive factor
in countries crop production and trading strategies (de
Fraiture et al., 2004; Wichelns, 2005).8 A water focus
shifts other production factors (e.g. land, labor, energy)
to the background (Kumar and Singh, 2005).
We do not set out to give a comprehensive overview of
this debate; instead the present contribution proposes an
alternative avenue. A more contemporary political econ-
omy perspective (e.g. Gilpin and Gilpin, 2003) shows that
most literature on virtual water tends to conﬂate states
with the people living in their territories, as if there were
perfect harmony between state and society and perfect
adaptivity between economic sectors. This gives a
reductionist perspective of how the international political
economy functions to even out local surpluses or deﬁ-
ciencies. The virtual water literature treats water as an
economic (Hoekstra and Hung, 2003) or environmental
good (Hoekstra, 2003), backgrounding its role as a
political good. Attention to ‘‘the political’’ highlights
rather different issues with respect to choices for or
against a ‘‘real’’ or a virtual water strategy. Deliberately or
unintentionally, virtual water policies work as an instru-
ment of power politics that affect the bargaining position
of interest groups in society. States may have overriding
political reasons for ignoring what Merrett (2003) calls
the ‘‘Kyoto Consensus’’ – the prescription to open up
markets for the sake of water conservation. It is therefore
important not only to concentrate on states that have (si-
lently) embraced a virtual water import strategy like
Egypt (Allan, 2001), but also on those who question it,
such as India. Both country cases are discussed in this
contribution.
Water as a political good
Why do states keep investing in water infrastructure and
protecting their farmers rather than let the market do its
work? This section discusses the political role of ‘‘real’’
water transport in state-society relations, and their inﬂu-
ence on such choices. It argues that water development
and sovereignty in (semi-)arid zones are core legitimising
state strategies that will not be easily given up. Political
manipulation of water scarcity is as important as eco-
nomic choices are. Dependence on the world market may
not only bring moral problems for the North (Merrett,
2003) but also political trouble for states of the South
(Richards and Waterbury, 1996).
While water supports biological and cultural reproduc-
tion and keeps economies going, it also reproduces political
power (Donahue and Johnston, 1998: 4). In economic
terms, the key rationale for state intervention is to reduce
citizens transaction costs in ﬁlling their needs. The ultimate
legitimizingmyth for state supremacy is that it keeps people
from ﬁghting each other for survival; order reduces trans-
action costs for citizens. In the course of time, states have, of
course, expanded their ‘‘security contract’’, taking on many
more roles that cushioning shocks andmishaps in acquiring
shelter, food and other needs. Political science literature
shows that states do not do this out of the goodness of their
institutional hearts. Once we recognise that the state is not a
disinterested political actor but a political agent that uses its
resources to (seek to) wrest control over the population and
economy in its territory, we can see how the states uncer-
tainty- and conﬂict-reduction strategy can be self-serving.
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A state can never be sure of the continued loyalty of
its citizens. Therefore, it develops control tactics rang-
ing from patronage and co-optation to extortion and
force vis-a`-vis society. Weber (1964) recognised that the
state may use force (its monopoly of the means of
violence), if necessary, to have its way. Power based on
force only is not really power: coercion tends to be
unsustainable. Non-violent, subtle forms of power can
provide the state with its prime political capital: legiti-
macy and control. Treating water as a political good
procures organisational inﬂuence and control rather than
an economic or cultural one. ‘‘Real water’’ projects like
Egypts Toshka scheme and Indias Narmada dams may
not be economically or hydraulically sensible, but they
make sense as political capital for governments. For a
developing state, becoming a ‘‘development(al) state’’
has proved a strategically powerful avenue that prom-
ises increased control and a growing tax base. To ﬁnd
the money, states look where the surplus is: an
emerging urban middle class and a reliable water supply
for irrigated farming in the countryside. Assured water,
often accompanied by assured inputs and minimum
prices, ties a rural clientele to the state. But a state
cannot afford to ignore the urban masses either, which
may revolt if they feel that their security interests are
badly served. Rural development promises to make
cheap food available for city dwellers.
‘‘Development’’ therefore is a powerful ‘‘hegemonic
strategy’’ sold on the premise that it will beneﬁt every-
one, even if it means local sacriﬁce in the form of mass
displacement or environmental destruction (Crush,
1995). This strategy is not only beholden to the
‘‘developing world.’’ For example, Spain is also bringing
water from its wet north to its dry south (e.g. Naredo,
1999). The main idea is ‘‘manipulability’’ of water and
food scarcity. An adequate understanding of scarcity
should include how scarcity and resource crises are
deﬁned, created, perceived, reproduced, and reduced
(Donahue and Johnston, 2001: 5). Water can be ‘‘colo-
nized’’, controlled and deployed to gain and maintain
control over people. Resource capture (Homer-Dixon,
1994) and mobilisation reduces uncertainty for economic
groups, in turn reducing uncertainty for the state. The
design of water infrastructure determines where ‘‘real’’
water goes, who gets it and who does not (Mollinga and
van Straaten, 1996; Turton, 1999).
Large and small infrastructural projects, preferably
externally funded, are effective ways to expand state
control. Thus, providing a reliable source of water helped
the Saudi government settle nomadic tribes in the 1920s.
Turkey is now in the last stages of building a 22-dam
project in the poor region of Southeast Anatolia. These
will irrigate the Harran plains and hydro-power new
industries. Among other rationales, this ‘‘Greater
Anatolia’’ Project can be seen as a way of integrating
centrifugal Kurds, creating jobs in irrigation, construc-
tion and industry (Warner, 2005).
Who pays for virtual water?
The infrastructural ‘‘hydraulic mission’’ (Reisner, 1986)
to mobilise ‘‘real water’’ for national development has
well-known social, economic and environmental costs
that offset its political beneﬁts. The question is whether,
as Turton (1999) maintains, a switch to virtual water is a
softer option – for its producers, but especially for its
consumers. While Wichelns (2004: 429) stresses that the
policy relevance of virtual water pertains primarily to its
supply side ‘‘because the embedded water concept is
pertinent only to producers,’’ there are considerable
distributive effects on the demand side, including the
importers or recipients of virtual water. Food can be
captured, hoarded and sold or withheld at an economic or
political premium in the form of conditionality on loans
and aid. Governments likewise intervene in the creation
or alleviation of food scarcity. Sen has shown that famine
can stem from the failure of people to access food (Sen,
1980; Sen, 1981). In times of increasing food scarcity,
wheat traders tend to hoard grain. The only alternative
for states to secure food for the population is to buy or
otherwise obtain food on the world market. For this, one
needs foreign currency or must curry favor with aid
providers; both entail a political risk.
The world market is not a level playing ﬁeld (Warner,
2003). Exposure to virtual water trade means exposure to
sudden price shocks in the world market, including
manipulation of trade politics. Five countries account for
80% of all cereal exports. While the Middle East, due to
its geo-strategic position and oil wealth, may have ben-
eﬁted, the same policy prescription is unlikely to work
well for, say, Sub-Sahara Africa, whose bargaining
position in the global political economy is weaker. Low
agricultural world prices hurt agrarian exporters who do
not have the option to subsidize their agricultural sector
(Neubert, 2001). For poor countries, trade means par-
ticipation in a system dominated by powerful interests.
A crucial question is: who or what will pay the bill for
virtual water imports? Prescriptive virtual water analysis
claims that countries should bank on the adaptive forces
in the international political economy to diversify their
economy. If they do not have to produce all food them-
selves, they can concentrate their energies on the devel-
opment of other sectors (as India did, for instance). A
‘‘weak’’ political economy is an unadaptive one, while a
‘‘strong’’ one diversiﬁes. Diversiﬁed national political
economies fare better than weak ones when faced with
drought and scarcity. However, a state that opts for food
imports will have to pay its virtual water bill, literally and
symbolically. As almost any non-agricultural water use is
more remunerative than agriculture, diversiﬁcation out of
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agricultural self-sufﬁciency (‘‘more jobs per drop’’) is
expected to generate funds and employment opportunities
to more than make up for the loss of food self-sufﬁciency.
For instance, the Singapore economy generates enormous
wealth that more than compensates for limited resource
endowments (Allan, 2001).
But this trajectory is not easily turned into reality.
First, imposed structural adjustment and liberalisation do
not wait for economies to be strong. ‘‘What would Ye-
men export that was not agriculturally based, other than
its own people?’’ (Richards, 2003: 65). Second, a non-
agricultural export state is not necessarily a diversifying
economy. Non-agricultural primary sector exports dom-
inate OPECs oil and gas producing countries, but are
owned by foreign multinational companies. Such ‘‘ren-
tier states’’ (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987) have felt – or
may soon feel – compelled to sign away large parts of
their sovereignty over resources developed on their ter-
ritory to be able to pay for their import bills (Kuwait,
Algeria, Bolivia). A virtual water strategy may intensify
resource sell-out and increase external dependencies for
cash-strapped states. Third, what about states that suc-
cessfully switch to manufacturing by neglecting their
agricultural sector? Given that food imports and aid are
usually heavily subsidised in the country of provenance,
they easily out-compete domestically produced food,
pushing small producers out of the market. Marginal
producers have nowhere to go but the city (Merrett,
2003).
At the domestic level, then, a naked switch to virtual
water imports in (semi-)arid regions is a choice for the
city, which may intensify non-water primary resource
sell-out and increase external dependency for cash-
strapped states. While we do not advocate economic
conservationism, it is important to consider the social
costs involved. Therefore, it is all the more important that
momentous economic choices like a virtual-water strat-
egy do not remain politically silent.
The political uptake of virtual water
It is tempting to see virtual water as ‘‘so much hot air’’.
But there is a danger in not taking seriously its potential
for informing far-reaching policy decisions. The politi-
cally efﬁcient but economically inefﬁcient state-led
‘‘hydraulic mission’’ of dams and development is under
attack from both free-marketers and environmentalists.
Aggressive resource capture for agrarian development
brings basin conﬂict, environmental destruction and
‘‘closure’’ (see Williams, 2003. These costs make it
unavoidable to start a painful adaptation process towards
a post-‘‘hydraulic mission’’ economy through diversiﬁ-
cation of exports and reallocation of water outside agri-
culture, so that the pressure on water resources is
relieved. Water stress in ‘‘closing basins’’ impel a switch
to a different hydro-social contract based on economic
principles like pricing and cost recovery and, indeed,
virtual water, to arrive at more environmentally sensible
management (Turton and Ohlsson, 1999).
Molden and de Fraiture (2004) doubt whether coun-
tries will change their trade policies because of pressing
global water scarcity issues. However, several policy-
makers have taken good notice of the virtual water
debate, not so much to save the planet as their own
economies, while virtual water could become part of an
existing ‘‘green conditionality’’ – environmental goals
as a form of donor leverage over national governments
who are not so quick to catch on (Leach and Mearns,
1996).
Israeli water managers, faced with acute water crisis in
the 1980s, were the ﬁrst to realize that every exported
orange meant a loss of scarce water (Allan, 2003;
Fishelson, 1994). In the 1990s, Jordans former Water
Minister Haddadin became a fan (e.g. Hoekstra and
Hung, 2003). Jordan now imports 60–90% of its food.
Policy makers in South Africa ‘‘got it’’ at a conference in
Oman in 1995 (Allan, 2003). A virtual water strategy
would obviate the need to build more expensive infra-
structure for intra- and inter-basin transfers.
Indians also paid close attention (Reddy, 2005; Sharma,
2003b; Sivakumar, 2004) when virtual water reached the
global water agenda at the March 2003 World Water
Forum. Here, the debate is highly unlikely to be ‘‘polit-
ically silent’’ – water and food sovereignty also have a
powerful political identity value. Sharma, echoing Leach
and Mearns (1996), observes that ‘‘countries of the South
rightfully wonder if this will be yet another imposition on
them! Otherwise why should 550 l of water to produce
ﬂour for one loaf of bread be of greater concern that
7000 l for producing 100 grams of beef?’’ (Sharma,
2004). The Hindu quotes Daniel Zimmer of the World
Water Council, who claims that ‘‘countries like India and
China … feel that because they have such large popu-
lations, the world market would not be able to supply
their food demands in any crisis and so … they want to
take care of their own food needs’’ (Sivakumar, 2004; see
Cai and Rosegrant, 2005).9
Instead, both countries are pursuing a food self-sufﬁ-
ciency strategy (World Water Council, 2004). India even
seems to be intensifying its virtual water export strategy:
‘‘… while India is gripped by a severe water crisis, and
even more severe water conﬂicts, our Deputy Chairman
of the Planning Commission [Montek Singh Ahluwalia]
is recommending that we export water as a virtual water
subsidy to the rich consumers of the North’’ (Shiva,
2005) in the form of water-intensive products like veg-
etables and fruits. However, a reverse trend of buying
farmers out of water-intensive cultivation into cultivation
of other crops is also visible in states with severe
groundwater problems like Punjab (see below).
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The case of Egypt is intriguingly paradoxical. Ap-
plauded by virtual water analysts for shifting from virtual
water export to imports in the 1970s, it has long resisted
the virtual water discourse itself. The silence over virtual
water allowed Egypt and other Middle East states to
avoid having to admit the painful truth that water sup-
plies are limited – which might lead to a legitimacy crisis
– while at the same time adjusting their economies to that
truth. However, this quiet adjustment has not been
without its social price. The next section will take a
closer look at food security, real water, and virtual water
in Egypt.
Egypt: A not so silent virtual water revolution
To what extent can Egypts food policy be analyzed as
based on a conscious policy decision to implement
‘‘virtual water policy’’? For the Egyptian state, the myth
that water will always be available has been an important
legitimising dogma, both for the domestic (voters) and
the international audience (upstream states and donors).
A Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources expert
said that the idea of there being water shortage is absurd.
Like many of its neighbours, Egypt has hardly begun to
contemplate the kind of ‘‘demand management’’ all
water-poor states will eventually have to accept, however
painful the transition will be. In Egypt, the dream of
‘‘water self-sufﬁciency’’ is alive and well.
In such a context, a prescription that Egypt should turn
more to the world market is anathema. When Beyene and
Wadley (2004: 35) discuss this as an option, they voice
concern that the market mechanism does ‘‘not account
for the different social meanings attributed to water
across state boundaries …. It is hard to predict … how
far the Egyptian farmers are ready to buy the idea of
detaching themselves from producing agricultural prod-
ucts, should the Egyptian government agree to imple-
ment the virtual water scheme.’’ What seems to have
escaped the authors is that Egyptian food producers –
whether they ‘‘buy the idea’’ or not – have already been
adjusting to a virtual water strategy for over 30 years.
Egypts 1959 ‘‘Full Utilisation of the Nile’’ treaty with
Sudan initially seemed to leave enough slack for
expanding water use for food and cotton production. But
expanding demand due to a population boom put pres-
sure on Egypts water quota. Egypts switch back to the
West entitled it to generous food aid and cheap imports,
reducing dependence on this quota. Nowadays, imports
meet half of Egypts food requirements; food constitutes
10.8% of Egypts imports bill. Importing food now saves
Egypt a Niles worth of premium water.
In this way, a ‘‘silent revolution’’ has realised an
economic adaptation process which spares the govern-
ment an embarrassing political debate on the question of
whether the state is accountable for a looming water
shortage and dependency on the rest of the world, a
debate Egyptian ofﬁcials prefer to keep silent about.
Egypts water professionals, some occupying strategic
positions in the UN and World Bank system, have long
refused to acknowledge and discuss virtual water (Allan,
2001). The emphasis on political silence revealingly
portrays politicisation as needlessly problematic and
political contest and popular protest as undesirable.
However, political contests about the road ahead can
contribute productively to debates about how to adjust to
scarcity and its allocative implications. Applying and
silencing virtual water means avoiding tough decisions
on rights and allocation between social groups and
countries, as well as on the relations (hydro-social con-
tract) between state and society.
When Nasser came to power in the 1950s, he sought
political support in the countryside by pushing through a
land reform (Bush, 2005). But the availability of cheap,
imported food and a swelling Cairo mean the countryside
is no longer a priority. As Richards and Waterbury (1996)
have noted, Egypts geography allows all food imports to
come in at a central location and be distributed for food
coupons to the growing number of urban poor. After the
IMF forced Egypt to take austerity measures, ‘‘bread
riots’’ broke out in Cairo in 1977. The Egyptian state
focused on the urban electorate while the infrastructural
links with and investments in the countryside were
neglected. Imported, subsidised food brings wealth to
harbours, not to farmers. Their bargaining power is ero-
ded, which may lead to further marginalisation. More-
over, like the Aswan High Dam, the harbour creates an
‘‘obligatory passage point’’ not open to most other states.
It is easier to control the distribution of imported food in
the harbour than of food produced by millions of fellahin
(small farmers) in rural areas (Richards and Waterbury,
1996). A virtual water (import) strategy has thus
strengthened political control while widening a socio-
economic gap between mega-city and countryside (and
between North and South Egypt). All such factors
intensiﬁed the rich-poor divide.
Nowadays the revolution is not so silent anymore. In a
second IMF-impelled wave of reforms, Egypt liberalised
its agrarian policies and reformed land tenure; over a
5-year period, tenants had to return their land to the
landowners. They had rented this land for 40 years at
ﬁxed rates; now the rents were allowed to skyrocket. As a
result, widespread violence broke out in the countryside,
due to police-assisted evictions of tenants. The inevitable
outcome was for tenants to swell the shantytowns of
Cairo (Bush, 2004, 2005).
While American food aid and low world food prices
eased the stress on Egypts water resources, Egypt also
has strategic reasons not to shout about it. In its Nile
negotiations, Egypt wants to uphold the claim that the
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country needs the 55.5 billion cubic metres it is entitled
to under the ‘‘Full Utilization of the Nile’’ treaty signed
with Sudan in 1959. Waterbury and Whittington (1999)
have shown how Egypts new land reclamation schemes
are a strategy to create facts on the ground. In the context
of the Nile Basin Initiative, Egypt may be able to stop
any upstream water resource development claiming these
‘‘needs’’. Some suggest that equitable distribution means
that Ethiopia, which was not party to the 1959 treaty,
should get at least as much Nile water as Sudan (e.g.
Tafesse, 2000). If virtual water were formally incorpo-
rated in Egypts water balance, very different ﬁgures
might emerge and weaken Egypts claim on the Nile.
Instead, Egypt is planning to irrigate 300,000–500,000
hectares and house 6 to 7 million inhabitants in the hot
desert, in light of Egypts supposed overpopulation
pressing on a narrow strip of fertile land (19,000 square
miles).10 This New Valley project aims to irrigate
300,000–500,000 ha in a vision remarkably similar to
that of the colonisers of the American West – develop the
land and the rain will come (Worster, 1992) – the Valley
will need 5–10 billion cubic metres per year in a country
where it rarely rains.
Things seem to be moving, though. During the Fourth
Water Forum in 2006, Egyptian water ofﬁcials came
round to at least recognising the virtual water concept.11
Egypt is now using water-saving technology, improved
drainage, drip irrigation, stepped-up recycling efforts and
levelling of arable land. It is also moving agriculture out
of water-guzzling crops, notably through cuts in rice and
sugar cane. This seems, ﬁnally, to evidence an acute if
tacit awareness of need for demand management. Egypt
will economise, recycle, and modernise its way out, but
does not seem ready to admit a water shortage, let alone
allow virtual water a place in Nile negotiations.
Depleted groundwater and redundant food stocks:
The case of Punjab, India
The Egyptian case shows that the rural peasantry has
been more or less ‘‘given up’’ by the state that opts for
virtual water imports in favour of the urban poor. The
following case from India, a country following a strategy
of food self-sufﬁciency, illustrates another dimension of
the politics of virtual water and food production. The
case focuses on plans to shift agricultural policies in the
Indian state of Punjab away from water-intensive crops
(rice, wheat), for which no ready market exists, towards
less water-intensive crops with, it is hoped, a more
promising market potential. The combined pressures of a
perverse food grain production system and ecological
degradation have made Punjabs status as grain exporter
to other states increasingly problematic. The plans were
presented in the report of the Johl Committee (Chief
Ministers Advisory Committee, 2002).12
Historically, the role of Indias government has been
overwhelming. At independence in 1947, India had to
import huge quantities of food grains to feed its rapidly
growing population. After the instatement of U.S. Public
Law 480, India became the biggest recipient of American
food aid in the early 1950s. This likely enabled India to
concentrate on industrialisation and, some claim, neglect
its agricultural base. But dependence on aid had serious
political implications. American food aid was tied to
political and economic concessions (a more open market)
in the 1965–1966 famine. In 1974, India switched to the
Soviet Union for food aid.
Given that memory, it is not surprising that, ideolog-
ically, agriculture is the backbone of development in
India. Gopalakrishnan, Secretary General of the Inter-
national Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID):
‘‘a country must be food secure (self-sufﬁcient) before
any trade can begin. Can empty bellies attempt to trade,
especially if the needs are sizeable and purchase power
is lacking?’’ (Sivakumar, 2004). There is a political
determination never to be dependent on food aid and
imports again.
In the mid-1960s, India still imported more than
13 million tonnes of food grains.13 However, the Green
Revolution was boosting food grain production in, for
instance, Punjab. India has a food grain procurement
system through the Food Corporation of India (FCI) that
guarantees a minimum support price (MSP) to producers.
As a consequence of this policy, in 2002 India had built
up a food stock of about 70 million tonnes (while only
22 million tonnes are needed for its buffer stocks for
national food security). These stocks exist side by side
with poverty and malnutrition among those without ac-
cess to resources or to the market.
However, wheat and rice production has reached such
high levels that stocks are growing while no ready
markets exist.14 Often wheat and rice crops replaced
other crops for which a strong demand existed like oil-
seeds, pulses and coarse grains. This remarkable growth
was made possible by a combination of incentive struc-
tures, input policies and infrastructural works. After a
period in which national production was growing while
imports continued, in the 1980s India became net
exporter of food grains. In the meantime, the fact that
supply exceeded (effective) demand had turned the
subsidy system from a beneﬁt into a major ﬁnancial
burden to the central government. Social tensions created
by prevailing market conditions (production costs
increasing more rapidly than minimum support prices)
arose.
Two earlier reports on reorganization of the electricity
tariffs and diversiﬁcation had warned against food grain
sector problems in the 1980s,15 but to no avail. The
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government even stimulated groundwater extraction
through electric pumping by keeping (ﬂat) electricity
rates low. This has always been an instrument for poli-
ticians to win political support from rural voters. In the
1980s, with a 20 million tonnes increase of Indian paddy
and wheat production in a few years, food grain demand
was soon getting satiated. As procurement policies
became a burden to the central government, it started
imposing excessive quality standards. This led to further
stagnation in procurement and increased farmer protests.
These developments and a growing awareness of the
ecological impact of intensive wheat–paddy cultivation –
primarily groundwater depletion – made it clear to the
1980s Committee on Diversiﬁcation that a shift towards
technically feasible and economically viable alternatives
like pulses and oilseeds was needed. In its advice, the
committee had to maintain a shaky balance between
farmer interests and state interests, state interest and
national interests, and between the mechanisms of a
market economy and food needs of the poor. The Johl
report states that ‘‘… the production of food grains could
not be considered in excess of the real needs of the nation
…. Yet, due to the lack of demand, primarily because of
the low purchasing power of the poor in the country,
supplies of food grains appeared to be in excess’’ (Chief
Ministers Advisory Committee, 2002: 6).
Paddy and wheat farmers were and are not enthusi-
astic. Returns from alternative crops will be lower,
market prices and demand less predictable, risks higher,
and storage possibilities smaller. Nor were there new
incentives in agricultural policy to make farmers shift.
Thus, while market prices for alternative crops were
higher than the minimum support prices (MSPs) guar-
anteed by the government, for wheat and paddy the MSP
was higher and continued rising.16 In this situation ‘‘the
farmers have to per force continue producing wheat and
rice crops in the state’’ (Chief Ministers Advisory
Committee, 2002: 10).
The politics of virtual water and real water
In Punjab, stagnation of food grain marketing due to an
agricultural policy based on perverse incentives to
farmers and over-extraction of groundwater were the key
issues. While ‘‘virtual water’’ is not explicitly mentioned
in the report, the virtual water debate plays an important
role. Apart from other environmental problems, the
report pays much attention to excessive groundwater
exploitation associated with intensive irrigated rice and
wheat cropping in Punjab. In the ‘‘dark zones’’ of Punjab
(Sharma, 2003b), the situation is critical and rapidly
deteriorating.17 The groundwater table is declining by
30 cm per year, and the critical depth (below 10 m) has
been reached in 28% of the state. In Central Punjab,
which produces 65% of Punjabs rice and 64% of which
is under rice crops, the situation is worse than average
(46% below critical depth in 1994). Tube well irrigation
covers 79% and canal irrigation 21% of total irrigation
needs. Punjab is paying a high economic, ecological,
social and political price for being the granary of India.
The current practices may ‘‘soon prove to be economi-
cally disastrous, socially untenable and politically
unsustainable’’ (Chief Ministers Advisory Committee,
2002: Annexure 1).
The Committee, therefore, formulated radical mea-
sures to restructure agriculture. It stresses the need to
‘‘rationalize the utilization of scarce water resources of
the state by the farmers, because it is a national resource
belonging to the society as a whole and cannot be al-
lowed to be irrationally exploited.’’ It also warns that the
existing conditions ‘‘might lead to a situation where the
possibilities of serious social unrest develop due to the
lack of market clearance for the produce of the farmers’’
(Chief Ministers Advisory Committee, 2002: 17).
The Johl committee advises to replace at least one
million hectares of paddy and wheat land by crops that
guzzle less water and ﬁnd a stronger market demand.
Currently the central government incurs a huge ﬁnancial
burden of procurement, handling, storage, damage and
loss, and transport of a product that has no market
demand. These can be used to subsidize paddy–wheat
farmers into alternative crops. To this purpose, the central
government should provide the state government with
funding for a ‘‘Crop Adjustment Programme’’. Again,
the debate is about supply and effective (market)
demand, not about the societal need for food: ‘‘although
these high stocks are in a sense illusory when viewed
from the perspective of nutritional needs of the Indian
population, because more than one-third of the people in
the country cannot meet their minimum nutritional
requirements for healthy living, yet this supply-demand
mismatch is of serious concern, because it puts heavy
ﬁnancial burden on the state exchequer’’ (Chief Minis-
ters Advisory Committee, 2002: Annexure 1).
Are there any (partial) alternatives to these radical
measures? The report mentions a number of changes in
agricultural practices to make cultivation less water-
intensive. Further, the development of more water-efﬁ-
cient paddy strains might provide new solutions to water
scarcity. However, Sharma wonders whether the current
political-institutional environment is conducive to the
introduction of alternatives to subsidized measures. His
doubts concern the use of subsidies to undo the current
conditions that are the product of earlier subsidy politics,
and the political character of agricultural policy and the
important role ascribed to the private sector in a readjusted
agriculture.18 The adjustment plan fully depends on central
government subsidies as an incentive for shifting to alter-
native crops. These subsidies serve various purposes, both
agricultural-economical and political (Sharma, 2003a).
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In the meantime, contract farming is being propagated
by the state government as the new future of a diversiﬁed
agriculture in Punjab and other Indian states (Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu). Sharma
(2006) concludes for Punjab that the ‘‘Governments
obsession with diversiﬁcation of crops has exposed
farmers to the vagaries of corporate interests in the
state’’.19 Contract farming does not work, according to
Sharma, because corporate interest in Punjab primarily
goes to water-guzzling basmati rice. In addition, the
quality argument is often used to reduce prices paid to
farmers.
Where virtual water is the topic of debate, ‘‘real wa-
ter’’ politics are never far away. In 2004, Punjab enacted
the Termination of Agreements Act. This act repealed
existing agreements on inter-state water sharing. Punjab
Chief Minister Singh legitimized this step, which
threatens access to water for neighbouring states like
Haryana and Rajasthan, with reference to water scarcity
and the need for agricultural diversiﬁcation. The Chief
Minister was cited saying: ‘‘the question… before all of
us should be about the future of Punjab…. What Punjab
is going through should be of concern to the nation
because it is we, who helped the country build up a huge
food grain buffer stock and protect its food security and
help it run its food distribution system’’ (Gill and Batth,
2004).
The issue focuses, among others, on the 306km Satluj–
Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal linking Rivers Satluj and
Yamuna. Punjab refused to build the last section of the
canal. This brought the state into conﬂict with neighboring
Haryana (which would be the main beneﬁciary). The
Punjab government argues that water transfers would
seriously affect its own farmers and make groundwater
recharge impossible. There even was political pressure in
favor of scrapping Section 5 of the Punjab Termination of
Agreements Act, which still guaranteed continued use of
water from two rivers (Ravi and Beas) by the non-riparian
state of Haryana (Venkatesan, 2004; Tribune News
Service, 2005).20
Signiﬁcantly, the conﬂict is not only about water but
also about geopolitics: Punjab has a number of long-
standing territorial claims on Haryana – to hand over the
town of Chandigarh and swap Hindi- for Punjabi-
speaking areas in the border area. These issues were dealt
with in a 1985 treaty that also foresaw the building of the
Satluj–Yamuna Link by Punjab but was never imple-
mented.21 Both territorial and water issues can be traced
back to the division of Punjab into the three smaller
states of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh in 1966.
In this context, the Punjab debate on crop diversiﬁcation
spawned by the crop adjustment programme plays an
important political role in two ways. First, it has created a
lot of unrest among wheat and paddy farmers. Many
farmers fear they will suffer the negative consequences of
crop diversiﬁcation: reduced incomes, greater uncertainty
and insecurity. Hence, they refuse to leave the wheat–
paddy-cropping pattern with its minimum support price
and guaranteed marketing opportunities (Pandher, 2006;
Shergill, 2005). In the perception of many farmers, crop
diversiﬁcation would not even be necessary if the states
river water would not be shared with other states. Hence,
there is a strong rural pressure on the state government to
take a harsh stance in its real water negotiations. Farmers
organizations, for instance, demanded cancellation of all
water treaties in which Punjab is involved.
Second, state politicians can use the affair for their
own political purposes and power games. According to
Swami (2004) ‘‘emotive mass mobilization on river
water issues has been a way for politicians to deﬂect
attention away from the very real agrarian crisis they
face and the need for serious, constructive reform.’’
Thus, the current focus on inter-state litigation, blaming
and claiming hides the issues of inefﬁcient state irri-
gation policies, the cultivation of water-guzzling crops,
and the need for water conservation and spread of
water-saving technologies: ‘‘neither state government …
seems willing to even discuss the possibility that the
right kind of public investment and usage policies could
be more important to their long-term water security than
the loss or gain of water through the SYL canal’’
(Swami, 2004).
Conclusion: Virtual water, real politics
On its journey from analytical concept to policy tool,
‘‘virtual water’’ is now increasingly in vogue to make
states more adaptive to resource scarcity pressures and
related environmental shocks. In this article we have,
ﬁrst, introduced the concept of virtual water and pin-
pointed some of its advantages and pitfalls in analyzing
issues of water scarcity and food security. A major
contribution is that it highlights an otherwise hidden
externality of global trade and its consequences; for food
importers (focus of attention in virtual water analyses) as
well as exporters (the focus of attention of water footprint
analysis).
For states facing water shortage, virtual water is part of
a wider palette of policy choices: moving water to people
(infrastructure), moving people to the water (zoning,
resettlement), importing food (virtual water), and demand
management (saving water). A choice between a ‘‘real
water’’ and ‘‘virtual water’’ policy, however, is a political
as much as an economic choice. Constructing infra-
structure means control of people and production, pres-
tige, self-esteem and sovereignty. Virtual water import
means central control of urban food supplies, freeing
states from obligations to rural development and reduc-
ing resource base mining.
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Without passing judgement on whether liberalization
is a better idea than subsidized agriculture, our contri-
bution sheds light on a number of political and practical
reasons why states and social actors may resist a shift
towards a market-dependent virtual water strategy in
countries that have so far aimed for food self-sufﬁciency.
It has allocative and (possibly destabilizing) social ef-
fects. It also impacts on established relations between
countries (e.g. Ethiopia and Egypt), between states (e.g.
Punjab and neighbouring states), and between states and
urban and rural interest groups in society (policy shifts
away from rural producers interests in both Egypt and
Punjab).
Scarcity can be induced and conditional. Economically
weak states without matching funds to pay for food
imports will have to accept loans and food aid with
political strings attached. While the U.S. has discontin-
ued food aid for political purposes to Egypt (a middle-
income country), Richards (2003) notes that American
governments are giving other client states cash in hand to
pay for food imports. The cases of Egypt and India show
the consequences of this dependency. Losing food sov-
ereignty may expose a state to embarrassing political
blackmail on the international scene, as especially India
has experienced. As water and food are political capital,
and sovereignty is furiously guarded, states will think
twice before opening up their economies.
What happens if a water-stressed state decides to shift
from food production to food imports but manages to
keep quiet about it? Egypt decided to cut its ‘‘special
relation’’ with the countryside and pacify its urban client
base with food coupons. This has inevitably led to
increased urbanization accompanied by social and
political tension. It was a mirage to expect that farmers
could easily adapt to international price shocks. Egyptian
farmers have, indeed, proved unable to compete with
subsidized imports and food aid, and moved to the city.
In this sense, a virtual water policy is almost a virtual
resettlement policy.
Virtual water also impacts on political relationships.
States struggling to remain in control dread an image of
scarcity and dependency in water domain or food
domain. In Egypt, the change from export to import has
long been too embarrassing to discuss. While the
‘‘political’’ silence surrounding virtual water may have
been comfortable for Egypts water authorities in the
short term, it has negated and postponed more funda-
mental social debate on water and food. The question
whether this is a good thing from an ethical perspective is
legitimate, but beside the point, our contribution suggests
that such issues will ﬁnd their political expression any-
way. In Egypt, the switch to imports and land liberal-
ization has had livelihood effects which now ﬁnd
political expression, whether in social instability or
parliamentary demands.
A public debate on the need for, and the price of,
adaptivity may lead to demands for accompanying
measures like compensation, or even to a decision
against relying on virtual water imports. This case study
suggests an interesting difference between virtual water
imports and exports. In Egypt, the need to conserve water
has opened up the arena for a debate on rationalising
water exports. This can be framed as a relatively safe
debate on demand management, efﬁciency and resource
conservation. Virtual water imports, however, remain
touchy due to the political taboo of dependency and
vulnerability in a ‘‘strong state’’.
The Punjab case illustrates similar dimensions of the
virtual water debate. First, like the Egyptian case, it
illustrates the political character of decisions concerning
water allocation and food production. However, in India
there is no taboo on the political debate. The burgeoning
debate shows that the proposed turn away from staple
food production shakes up established interests and
relationships. Finding ‘‘the’’ solution to scarcity in an
arena where any policy move is heavily politicized and
contested by one of the parties involved is not possible
without inﬂicting pain on one or more parties; one partys
solution is anothers nightmare.
The Indian situation is complicated by the differential
or contradictory interests of state and central government.
The states need for agricultural reform may be seen in
the long term as a threat to national food self-sufﬁciency.
It also goes against the short-term interests of food pro-
ducers who enjoy the advantages of a subsidized and
secure market. However, doing nothing would ultimately
chase farmers away from food grain production. What-
ever direction the food policies of the state of Punjab and
India will take, it is bound to be heavily politicized and
have this complex component of multiple levels and
scales of governance.
Where the Egyptian case underscores the importance of
linkages between the virtual water debate and transboun-
dary ‘‘real’’ water issues, the Punjab case shows similar
linkages between virtual water policy and real water issues
with political consequences for relationships between
states as well as between Punjab and the national govern-
ment. The pressures exerted by farmer organizations to
revoke water-sharing agreements with neighbouring states
shows that rural populations are indeed a political force to
be reckoned with. However, their current role is primarily
the outcome of a long history of strategizing by political
elites bent on extending their power into rural areas.
Therefore, we must add virtual water strategies to
those based on a ‘‘real-water’’ hydraulic mission, reset-
tlement and demand management as strategies with
redistributive outcomes and political effects. It is crucial
to realize that, when states show enthusiasm in exploring
sustainable social and environmental water use, political
sustainability is never far from their minds.
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Notes
1. Also called embedded, encapsulated, shadow or sup-
posed water.
2. The concept can also be applied to other (non-food; non-
agricultural) goods and services (Hoekstra and Hung,
2003) and resources (e.g. land, labour).
3. In relation to issues like urbanisation, globalisation, food
aid, food imports, and food habits.
4. In 2000, an estimated 67% of the worlds total freshwater
withdrawal went to agriculture. By 2025,water requirements
in agriculture will have increased by 1.2 times, in industry by
1.5 times, and for domestic consumption by 1.8 times
(UNEP, 2002).
5. About one ﬁfth of total world trade; 80% of virtual water
ﬂows is embedded in agricultural, 20% in industrial
products. Produced with an actual 1.2 trillion m3 per year, a
352 billion m3 saving is claimed, especially in crop pro-
duction. The ‘‘water footprint,’’ which can be determined
internally or externally, for individuals or nationally, ex-
presses water use in relation to consumption (Chapagain
et al., 2005; UNESCO, 2006: 392).
6. Thus, turning vegetarian reduces your water footprint by
4,000 l a day!
7. Countries with high water availability like Japan, Portugal
and Indonesia have high virtual water imports, while
Afghanistan, Malawi, India, Thailand and Denmark are
water-stressed but export much virtual water (Kumar and
Singh, 2005: 765, 785).
8. Political and economic considerations like production
increase for food self-sufﬁciency, poverty reduction and
food security may be more important and constrain policy
options for virtual water trade, especially for poor countries
sensitive to price ﬂuctuations on the food market (de
Fraiture, 2004; World Water Council, 2004; Kumar and
Singh, 2005). A contrary trend pushes countries away from
food self-sufﬁciency, to meet the growing water demand
from other sectors (Kumar and Singh, 2005).
9. Reddy argues that a virtual water import strategy will, for
socioeconomic reasons, not be relevant for India. He sees,
however, three important contributions of the concept: for
critical consideration of exports (India being the ﬁfth
largest virtual water exporter in the world); for making
agricultural policy choices between states to optimize water
use; and to increase public awareness of the resource
consequences of consumption (Reddy, 2005).
10. Just 5% of Egypt is inhabited by some 63 million Egyp-
tians. Egyptian ‘‘decentralisation policy’’ has resettled
hundreds of thousands of Egyptians and seeks to resettle
6 million more. Mitchells (1995) analysis of World Bank
documents however shows that the portrayal of Egypt as a
space-constrained country in need of development is un-
founded.
11. Personal communication with J.A. Allan, May 11, 2006.
12. We thank Dr. Sudhirendar Sharma, director of the Eco-
logical Foundation, Delhi, India, for discussing with us the
Punjab case and sending us a copy of the report of the Johl
Committee.
13. Unless stated otherwise, this section is based on informa-
tion found in the Johl report.
14. The state produced 3 million tonnes of foodgrains in 1961,
and 25.3 tonnes in 2000–2001. Thus, its share in total
national grain production amounts to 12.9% (22.6% of
wheat and 10.8% of rice) (Chief Ministers Advisory
Committee, 2002).
15. The committees responsible for these earlier reports had
also been chaired by Johl.
16. Thus, in the 1990/1991–2001/2002 period theMSPof paddy
increased by 159%, that ofwheat by 184% (ChiefMinisters
Advisory Committee, 2002: 8)
17. ‘‘Dark zone’’ areas suffer from severe groundwater over-
exploitation. See Prakash (2005).
18. Readjustment towards proposed market crops will make
farmers dependent on unstable and uncertain markets and
buyback arrangements with the private sector.
19. In 2005 some 80,000 hectares had been brought under
contract farming in Punjab (Bhatt, 2005). Punjab has tar-
geted one million acres or 10% of its total acreage by
2008. Main player in this reshufﬂe of agriculture is the
Punjab Agro Industries Corporation (see Sarkar, 2004).
20. Punjab claims that non-riparian states like Haryana are not
entitled to water from these rivers (Swami, 2004).
21. The Rajiv Gandhi-H.S. Longowal accord (Swami, 2004).
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